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The sale of meat and poultry contains asymmetric information dealing with food safety. 45 Since pathogens in most cases are invisible, consumers lack information on the safety of meat 46 and poultry. Government interaction through the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) in 47 the meat and poultry industry is necessary to regulate the safety of meat and poultry products. 48 Inevitably, any rules in society are likely to include violators. In the meat and poultry industry, 49 violators of the regulations may see economic benefit to do so. The cost of perfectly safe food is 50 far too great for the industry to bear. The marginal gain in revenue from violating a regulation 51 may be greater than the marginal cost. Violators of rules may resort to sophisticated means to 52 avoid detection of the original violations. The means used to avoid detection may be legal or 53 illegal in and of themselves. Effective regulation of avoidance activities will lead to lower 54 violations of the original crime. Such regulations may be ex-ante or ex-post. This paper 55 discusses potential effectiveness of ex-ante or ex-post regulations on avoidance activities of food 56 safety regulations in the meat and poultry industry. The use of ex-ante measures such as 57 contracting external service providers coupled with the threat of ex-post punishment on service 58
providers would potentially decrease the number of avoidance activities and their associated 59 original crime in the meat and poultry industry .  60  61  62  63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82 124  125 In general, the sale of meat and poultry contains asymmetric information dealing with 126 safety. Since pathogens in most cases are invisible, consumers lack information on the safety of 127 meat and poultry. Government interaction through the Food Safety and Inspection Service 128 (FSIS) in the meat and poultry industry is necessary to regulate the safety of meat and poultry 129 products. Inevitably, any rules in society are likely to include violators. In the meat and poultry 130 industry, violators of the regulations may see economic benefit to do so. The cost of perfectly 131 safe food is far too great for the industry to bear. The marginal gain in revenue from violating a 132 regulation may be greater than the marginal cost. Violators of rules may resort to sophisticated 133 means to avoid detection of the original violations. The means used to avoid detection may be 134 legal or illegal in and of themselves. Effective regulation of avoidance activities will lead to 135 lower violations of the original crime. Such regulations may be ex-ante or ex-post. The paper 136 will examine potential effectiveness of ex-ante or ex-post regulations on avoidance activities of 137 food safety regulations in the meat and poultry industry. 138 139
History of FSIS 140 
141
The beginning of federal inspection in the meat and poultry industry stems from the 142 development of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1862. The expansion of 143 the railroad, along with the development of refrigeration, enabled packers to process year round 144 and ship farther distances. The Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) was created in 1884 to prevent 145 diseased animals from making their way in to human food. Upton Sinclair published a book 146 titled "The Jungle" in 1905, which exposed the unsanitary conditions at meat packinghouses in 147
Chicago. The book pressured congress and then president, Theodore Roosevelt, to pass both the 148
Food and Drug Act along with the Meat Inspection Act. Recordkeeping is used to help inspectors verify the PR/HACCP regulations are being followed 217 (USDA 1996) . Dates of compliance are determined by the size of the plant. Plants with 500 or 218 more employees had a compliance deadline of January 1998. Small plants with the number of 219 employees ranging from 10 to 499 had to comply by January 1999, and very small plants with 220 less than ten employees or less than $2.5 million in annual sales had a deadline of January 2000. 221 In the case of LaGrou distribution systems, the crime was the sale of adulterated meat 454 and using multiple avoidance activities to prevent detection. LaGrou distribution systems 455 operated a cold storage warehouse in Chicago. The warehouse stored both meat and poultry 456 products for their customers. On occasion, the total amount of product coming in and going out 457 in a day would reach two million pounds. Along with storing meat and poultry products, the 458 warehouse was a perfect habitat for rodents. The rodents created unsanitary conditions at the 459 warehouse, which allowed meat and poultry products to become adulterated. LaGrou employees would destroy products in which the rodent damage was visible by the naked 467 eye. However, LaGrou did not conduct any tests to ensure other products were not adulterated. 468 As the problem worsened, employees were instructed to participate in so-called "Rat Patrols", 469
where at one point 50 rats were captured. These patrols were not effective in controlling the 470 rodent problem, and LaGrou's pest control company recommended steps to alleviate the 471 problem. The steps recommended were to: cement holes in the walls, seal sewer lids, and rodent 472 proof their doors. Stewart believed the costs were too great and he never gave Smith the 473 authority to follow through with the recommendations. On many occasions, customers would 474 make claims for damaged product. On one occasion a customer made a claim that their product 475 was damaged by rodents. After hearing the claim, Stewart sent them a letter stating they have a 476 small rodent problem in their basement freezer and that the customer's product would be moved. 477
The customer's product was never moved, and the rodent problem was not isolated to one area. 478
LaGrou did note product damage on customer's bills, however they would never report it as 479 rodent damage. They would use such terms as damaged by the forklift etc. instead. In the spring 480 of 2001, a quality assurance manager for a LaGrou customer, Aura Foods, came to inspect their 481 product. The manger found a severe rodent problem, along with mold, ceiling and wall damage, 482 and other unsanitary conditions. When the problem was brought to the attention of Stewart 483 through a claim of product damage by Aurora Food, he quickly downplayed the situation. processed and stored. That same day both inspectors examined the warehouse more thoroughly. 492
The inspectors found adulterated meat products, fresh rodent droppings, along with many other 493 sanitation violations. The inspectors told Smith they would return the next day to inspect the 494 entire facility and that no product should enter or leave the downstairs freezer of the warehouse. 495
With the knowledge of inspectors returning the next day, Stewart told LaGrou employees to 496 clean up the warehouse and remove damaged product. A total of fourteen USDA inspectors, 497 along with inspectors from other agencies, such as the FDA, arrived at the facility the following 498 morning. The damaged product was found by inspectors in dumpsters. Samples of the products 499 were tested and were found to be contaminated with rodent hair and fecal matter. The food 500 product stored at LaGrou was adulterated by rodents and other unsanitary conditions. All the 501 food products stored at the facility, a total of 22 million pounds, were detained on May 30, 2002. 502
The detained products were either destroyed or decontaminated. Customers of LaGrou along 503 with the USDA were able to develop a decontamination system to save over 12 million pounds 504 of product. The cost of decontaminating was $2.7 million. LaGrou was ordered to pay 505 restitution to their customers in the amount of $8.2 million ($2.7 million for decontamination and 506 $5.5 million for destroyed product). The company was convicted with knowingly storing meat 507 and poultry products in unsanitary conditions. A $2 million fine was imposed on LaGrou along 508 with a 5-year probation. Jack Stewart was convicted of five felonies and sentenced to pay part of 509 the $8. Detection of the avoidance activity and the original crime are correlated. Generally, 516 when a crime is detected the underlying avoidance activities are also detected. Avoidance 517 activity can be controlled using either price or quantity methods. When using price control, the 518 avoidance activity becomes more costly and decreases the likelihood of the business 519 participating in the original crime. Decreasing the benefit from an avoidance activity is also 520 considered price control. Price control may use taxes to increase the cost of an avoidance 521 activity. In the meat industry, the benefit and or cost of avoidance activity may be changed to 522 limit the occurrence of crimes such as the sale of adulterated meat and the sale of uninspected 523 meat. Quantity control reduces the occurrence of avoidance activity by limiting the use of an 524 activity. Requiring licensing for label makers in the meat industry may reduce the occurrence of 525 a business mislabeling their product. Another example of quantity control would be prohibiting 526 or limiting the sale and possession of avoidance devices. (Nussim and Tubbach). 527 528
Two other options of avoidance control include ex-ante regulations, and ex-post 529 punishment. Both options can be used with price or quantity control. However, price control 530 tends to be used with ex-post punishment and quantity control tends to be used with ex-ante 531 regulations. Ex-post punishment is used after the avoidance activity has been detected, while ex-532 ante regulations are used to prevent the avoidance activity. With the avoidance activity such as 533 mislabeling, an ex-ante regulation could be additional labeling and record keeping requirements 534 of businesses, set forth by the USDA. Ex-post punishment may increase crime because it 535 increases the marginal cost and marginal revenue of committing the crime. Ex-ante regulations, 536 however, increases the cost of avoidance decreasing the likelihood of a business participating in 537 avoidance activities and the original crimes. Control of avoidance before detection using ex-ante 538 measures is difficult, since the regulations may hit the wrong target and have no affect on the 539 original crime. Ex-ante regulations may also be targeted at activities that are legal when used 540
properly which can affect non-violators of the crime. Ex-ante quantity control regulations are 541 hard to implement in cases where detection is necessary. (Nussim and Tubbach). 542 543
Private action and government regulations both contribute to food safety. When a 544 business increases their food safety to satisfy their customers, it is called private action.
545
Contracts between the meat or poultry processor and their customer may include limits on 546 pathogens and sanitation control. The meat and poultry processor benefits from higher prices 547 and a guaranteed buyer, when they adhere to the contract's safety requirements. The customer 548 yields benefits from the contract since there is greater control of food safety and less recalls or 549 opportunity cost. Branding of products is also included in private action. When a product is 550 branded, a consumer can recognize the product and its history. The consumer may determine the 551 branded product is unsafe because of recent recalls and not purchase the product. Along with the 552 potential loss of sales with branding, there are also benefits for the meat or poultry processor. If 553 meat or poultry processor is able to produce safe food without recalls, than they may charge a 554 premium for their product. The most effective and efficient method of controlling food safety 555 processes are a variety of government regulations and private actions that include all food safety 556
concerns. An increase in FSIS product testing along with reporting their findings to the public 557 would help increase private action and food safety. Reporting PR/HACCP and SSOP 558 compliance inspections to consumers will increase the demand for safe food and in turn private 559 action in the meat industry (Ollinger and Moore). When consumers are effectively informed on 560 the food safety of the products than an efficient degree of food safety is attainable (Antle 1996 The use of contracts with other service providers can reduce avoidance activity and the 621 original crime. The contracts can be set up with accountants, lawyers, and financial advisors. 622
The contracts would resemble the pest control example by increasing the liability of the service 623
provider. Rules and regulations already exist for accountants and lawyers, so the regulations 624 associated fine's amount would be increased to limit avoidance activity. The increase in the 625 fine's amount will also increase the amount of money a service provider will charge to 626 processors to participate in avoidance activities. 627 628
The service providers fine and/ or restitution cost would have to be greater than the sum 629 of the contract fee and the economical benefit their customer may receive for their participation 630 in the original crime and avoidance activity. The sale of uninspected meat and tax evasion of an 631 'x' amount would be an example of the economical benefit a service provider may receive from 632 illegal activity. The service provider and processor would have no economical gain from 633 avoidance activity. The amount of contract fees that will be transferred to consumers is 634 undetermined at this point. The sale of meat and poultry contains asymmetric information dealing with food safety. 641
Since pathogens in most cases are invisible, consumers lack information on the safety of meat 642 and poultry. Government interaction through the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) in 643 the meat and poultry industry is necessary to regulate the safety of meat and poultry products. 644
Inevitably, any rules in society are likely to include violators. In the meat and poultry industry, 645 violators of the regulations may see economic benefit to do so. The cost of perfectly safe food is 646 far too great for the industry to bear. The marginal gain in revenue from violating a regulation 647 may be greater than the marginal cost. Violators of rules may resort to sophisticated means to 648 avoid detection of the original violations. The means used to avoid detection may be legal or 649 illegal in and of themselves. Effective regulation of avoidance activities will lead to lower 650 violations of the original crime. Such regulations may be ex-ante or ex-post. This paper 651 discusses potential effectiveness of ex-ante or ex-post regulations on avoidance activities of food 652 safety regulations in the meat and poultry industry. 
